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LIBERTA REVISITED: A CALL TO REPEAL
THE MARITAL EXEMPTION FOR ALL SEX
OFFENSES IN NEW YORK'S PENAL LAW
Cassandra M. DeLaMothe*
"I think it is worse to have your husband rape you. It is somebody you
loved, somebody you trusted. He took everything we had and threw it
out the window. He made our life together dirty."'
-marital rape victim
"Domestic violence is something that tragically will never go away.
But it is something that the state can do far more to P2revent, far more
to educate people about and far more to prosecute."
-Governor George E. Pataki; February 22, 1996
Introduction
A recent newspaper article described an incident in which a hus-
band showed up at his wife's door after her children left for school.
The husband choked and pushed his wife. She fell and broke her
ankle. Then the husband grabbed a kitchen knife and ripped off
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 1980, Trenton
State College. The author wishes to thank Professor Tracy E. Higgins, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law for her helpful comments and suggestions, and Research Libra-
rian Yvette LeRoy for her assistance in researching this issue. The author is grateful
to Assistant District Attorney Lisa M. Friel of the New York County District Attor-
ney's Office and Assistant District Attorney Lisa Linsky of the Westchester County
District Attorney's Office for sharing their comments and experiences. Many thanks
to Journal editors Valerie White, Lee Rudy, and Bernard Daskal for their many com-
ments and suggestions. Finally, the author is deeply indebted to her husband, Jean,
whose endless patience and support made this Note possible.
1. John Caher, Spousal Sex Assaults Still Tough to Prosecute, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany), July 8, 1990, at Al (quoting an Albany County marital rape victim who dis-
agreed with contention of opponents of marital rape prosecution that spousal victims
suffer less trauma than victims of stranger rape).
2. Clifford J. Levy, Pataki Proposes Law to Let Prosecutors Appeal Sentences,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at Al, B4 (quoting New York Governor George E. Pataki
at a news conference during which he proposed that prosecutors be permitted to ap-
peal bail amounts and sentences set by judges after a New York judge freed a con-
victed rapist in a domestic violence case who later killed his girlfriend and then
himself). One month later, at Governor Pataki's request, the New York State Senate
introduced the Domestic Violence and Public Safety Act of 1996 proposing an
amendment of New York Criminal Procedure Law §§ 450.30, 530.30, & 530.42, which
would allow prosecutors, under certain circumstances, to appeal unduly lenient
sentences. See N.Y. S.B. 6621, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1995).
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her clothes. As she screamed in pain from the broken ankle, the
husband raped and sodomized her.
The legal system generally treats husbands differently from
others accused of assault and battery, despite laws allowing prose-
cution for spousal abuse.' The police and the courts have not effec-
tively responded to domestic violence cases.5 Many states
implicitly sanction marital rape by failing to adequately treat it as a
crime.6 The marital exemption precludes the prosecution of hus-
bands for sexually assaulting their wives. Penal laws containing a
marital exemption typically define rape as sexual intercourse with a
woman who is not married to the actor.7
In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Liberta,8
held that the marital rape exemption in New York's Penal Law is
unconstitutional. 9 To date, however, the New York Legislature has
failed to amend the Penal Law to expressly criminalize spousal
rape. Moreover, some lower New York courts continue to apply
some form of the marital exemption to sex offenses. 10
This Note argues that to fully protect victims of spousal sexual
assault, the New York Legislature should codify the Liberta deci-
sion and repeal the marital exemption for all sex offenses. Part I
outlines the history of the marital rape exemption and its evolution
in New York. Part II discusses the Liberta decision and the barri-
ers to effective prosecution of marital rape, such as the legal stan-
3. See George James, Man Found Guilty of Raping His Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
1995, at B5 (describing the facts of a case in which a New York City man was ulti-
mately convicted of raping his wife). The defendant was eventually sentenced to a
term of 10 to 20 years in prison. See George James, Man Gets 1O-to-20-Year Term for
Raping His Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at B10.
4. Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and
Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape & Stalking, 78 MARO. L. REV. 79, 81
(1994) ("The history of domestic violence and marital rape reveals that these offenses
have been sanctioned and perpetuated by the criminal justice system, itself a reflec-
tion of existing social attitudes.").
5. See id. ("A review of data shows that the response to cases involving domestic
abuse by the criminal justice system, from the police to the courts, has been ineffec-
tual and inconsistent.").
6. See id. (stating that "marital rape is not treated as a crime" in many states).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 1987) (defining rape in the first
degree as sexual intercourse by a "male" with a "female") and N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.00(4) (McKinney 1987) (defining "female" as "any female person who is not
married to the actor"). See also DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 17 (1990)
(stating that rape laws usually define rape "as the forcible penetration of the body of a
woman, not the wife of the perpetrator").
8. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
9. Id. at 573. The Liberta decision applied to first degree rape and first degree
sodomy. See id. at 572 n.3.
10. See discussion infra part II.B.1.
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dard for "force," prosecutorial discretion in charging husbands,
and gender bias in the courts. Part III gives policy arguments for a
statutory amendment and offers a proposed statute to replace the
current sex offenses sections of the Penal Law. This Note con-
cludes that victims of marital sexual assault will receive full protec-
tion under the law only when the Legislature amends the New
York Penal Law to expressly criminalize marital sexual assault.
I. The Marital Rape Exemption: A Historical Perspective
The common law doctrines underlying the marital rape exemp-
tion reflect the pervasive historical subordination of women in the
law.'1 In early societies, men controlled many aspects of women's
lives, and the common law reflected this domination. 2 Sexual con-
tact within the context of marriage was presumptively consensual.
13
Marriage implied the husband's "right to sexual intercourse with
the wife upon all occasions.""
A. Common Law Theories
Several common law theories contributed to the subjugation of
women. Under the feudal doctrine of coverture, which prevailed
from about the eleventh century through the sixteenth century, a
woman lost her legal identity upon marriage and the law denied
her political power and status.15 Married women were denied the
11. See Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent Developments in the Law of
Marital Rape, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 345 (1990) ("The marital exemption de-
veloped as a corollary of common law property and contract doctrines."); Schelong,
supra note 4, at 86-88 (discussing various rationales behind the English common law
doctrines that justified the forcible rape of wives by their husbands).
12. See Schelong, supra note 4, at 83-84. For example, A Hebrew husband pos-
sessed the power to condemn his wife to death for committing adultery. Id. at 84.
Early Roman law even permitted a husband to "beat, divorce, or murder his wife for
offenses she committed that disparaged his honor or threatened his property rights."
Id. (citing R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES:
A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 36-37 (1979)).
13. Buckborough, supra note 11, at 345 ("Proponents of the theory [of implied
consent] assert that a woman who enters into a sexual relationship with a man, even
for a short period of time, legally surrenders her right to refuse having sex with that
man in the future."). Id. at 345-46. "Th[e] marital rape exemption was derived from
an outdated belief that because the fact of marriage itself implies irrevocable consent
to sex, nonconsensual sex in marriage is legally impossible." Developments in the
Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1533 (1993).
14. See RUSSELL, supra note 7, at 17 (quoting HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B.
BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 163 (1980)).
15. See Schelong, supra note 4, at 86 ("Since women were denied both [status and
political power], they inescapably were inferior citizens.") (citing Salina Szechtman,
Wife Abuse: Women's Duties - Men's Rights, 10 VICTIMOLOGY: INT'L J. 253, 254
19961 859
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privilege of land ownership until the nineteenth century. 16 Accord-
ing to Sir William Blackstone, a husband, under the doctrine of
coverture, had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she mis-
behaved, allowing him to maintain order within the family.' 7
Under the marital unity theory,18 which derived from the doc-
trine of coverture, the wife and the husband became one upon
marriage. 19 According to Blackstone, "[b]y marriage, the husband
and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband:
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing
.... "20 The wife could not make a contract, sue another party, own
personal property, or make a will. 2' Before the nineteenth century,
a husband did not make a contract with his wife since it was tanta-
mount to making a contract with himself.22
Under the chattel theory, introduced around the sixth century, a
woman was first the property of her father and then, upon mar-
riage, the property of her husband.23 TWo means of acquiring valu-
(1985)). See also ARTHUR R. CLEVELAND, WOMAN UNDER THE ENGLISH LAW 71
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1896).
16. See Schelong, supra note 4, at 86 (observing that feudal society perceived wo-
men as child-bearers, unable to defend land, and therefore excluded them from land
ownership and political power); CLEVELAND, supra note 15, at 280-81 (noting that
with the passage of the Married Women's Property Act, married women finally had
the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property).
17. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *432 ("For, as he is to answer for
her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of
restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is al-
lowed to correct his servants or children.. . ."). See also Schelong, supra note 4, at 87
("Chastisement was also justified as a means of maintaining family discipline and
order.").
18. This theory is also known as the "unities" theory. See Schelong, supra note 4,
at 86.
19. See id. (stating that the "unities theory... advanced the subjugation and sub-
ordination of women even further") (citing Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital
Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256
(1986)) [hereinafter Note, To Have and to Hold].
20. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *430 (footnote omitted).
21. Schelong, supra note 4, at 86. See also Note, To Have and to Hold, supra note
19, at 1256 ("The unities doctrine thus served to legitimate the propertization of wo-
men through marriage.").
22. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *430 ("For this reason, a man cannot grant any
thing to his wife, or enter into covenant with her: for the grant would be to suppose
her separate existence; and to covenant with her, would be only to covenant with
himself. . . .") (footnote omitted).
23. Buckborough, supra note 11, at 345 (observing that "the law granted a prop-
erty right in a woman's sexuality first to her father, and then to her husband). See also
CLEVELAND, supra note 15, at 24 (stating that if a man abducted an unmarried wo-
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able property and social status involved two English customs:
bride capture, in which a man conquered a woman through rape,
and stealing an heiress, in which a man kidnapped a woman for
marriage.24 Rape laws developed from these customs to protect
the property rights of male relatives of the victim from other men,
not to protect women.25 Rape laws also protected a man's valuable
property interest in his wife's chastity or daughter's virginity.26 For
example, if a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of steal-
ing her father's property, and if "a husband raped his wife he was
merely using his property. 27
Scholars credit the English jurist Sir Matthew Hale with creating
the marital exemption for rape under the theory of implied con-
sent. During the seventeenth century, Hale stated that "the hus-
band cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his
lawful wife for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract
the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which
she cannot retract. 28 Since the husband and wife were legally one,
the common law did not recognize a wife's refusal to have sex with
her husband.29 Hale's assertion became the basis for the marital
rape exemption in England and the United States.3 °
man, he had to pay the owner and later, buy her from the owner; buying and marrying
a wife were synonymous).
24. Schelong, supra note 4, at 87 (citing Note, To Have and to Hold, supra note 19,
at 1257). See also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND
RAPE 17 (1975) ("[M]arriage appears to have been institutionalized by the male's
forcible abduction and rape of the female.").
25. See Sandra L. Ryder & Sheryl A. Kuzmenka, Legal Rape: The Marital Rape
Exemption, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 394 (1991). See also BROWNMILLER, supra
note 24, at 17.
26. See Buckborough, supra note 11, at 345 (citing Note, The Marital Rape Ex-
emption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306, 309 (1977)).
27. Schelong, supra note 4, at 87. See also Ryder & Kuzmenka, supra note 25, at
394 ("[P]rosecuting a husband for raping his wife made no more sense than indicting
him for stealing his own property.").
28. 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S. Emlyn ed. 1778),
quoted in Buckborough, supra note 11, at 346. See also Rene I. Augustine, Marriage:
The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559, 560 (1990-91) ("Any perceived objec-
tivity on Hale's part toward women is tainted by the facts that he burned women at
the stake as witches and has been characterized as a misogynist.").
29. See Buckborough, supra note 11, at 346.
30. Augustine, supra note 28, at 561 (citations omitted). Hale gave no legal basis
for his statement, but his assertion was the most cited authority for the marital rape
exemption in this country. Id at 560-61.
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B. The Marital Rape Exemption in New York
New York followed most states in recognizing a marital exemp-
tion for rape. 31 The marital exemption, codified in the Penal Code
of 1909,32 offered a husband absolute protection from prosecution
for the rape of his wife.
The 1922 case of People v. Mel 33 illustrates the peculiar notion
of the husband's proprietary interest in his wife's sexuality. The
trial court convicted John Meli of raping his wife.34 Meli did not
commit the act himself but aided and abetted another man in rap-
ing his wife. 35 He contended that the marital rape exemption in
the penal code should bar his prosecution. 36 Meli argued that be-
cause he could not be guilty of marital rape under the penal code,
he could not be guilty of aiding another person in raping his wife.37
Relying on Hale's assertion,38 the court found that a husband
had a right to rape his wife, but that right was his alone.39 " 'It is
true that he may enforce sexual connection, and, in the exercise of
this marital right, it is held that he cannot be guilty of the offense of
31. See OLIVER L. BARBOUR, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 71 (1852) ("A man can not be guilty of a rape upon his own wife; for
the matrimonial consent can not be retracted; but he may be guilty as a principal by
assisting another person to commit a rape upon his wife.") (footnote omitted).
32. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2010 (Consol. 1909). This section provided in part:
A person who perpetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female not
his wife, against her will or without her consent... [is guilty of rape in the
first degree and punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.
A person who perpetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female, not
his wife, under the age of eighteen years, under circumstances not amount-
ing to rape in the first degree, is guilty of rape in the second degree, and
punishable with imprisonment for not more than ten years.
33. 193 N.Y.S. 365 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
34. Id. at 365-66. Meli received a sentence of eight to ten years for first degree
rape after a trial in a Chautauqua County Court. Id. at 365. He appealed that sen-
tence in the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County, by application for a writ of habeas
corpus. Id.
35. Id. at 365. Meli was present at the rape and actually helped to overcome his
wife. Id.
36. Id. at 366. Meli argued that rape within marriage did not exist in the penal
code. Id.
37. Id. Meli argued that since he "could not be guilty of the crime as an actual
perpetrator and therefore punished directly, he [could not] be punished indirectly
under.., the Penal Law as a principal." Id.
38. See HALE, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39. Meli, 193 N.Y.S. at 366-67. "The husband can be guilty of the crime of rape, in
so far as his wife is concerned, if he procured the offense to be committed upon her by
another, or aided or abetted that other in so doing. If he was the one who with force
and against her consent performed the sexual act upon her, there was and could be no
rape." Id. at 366.
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rape. But it is too plain for argument that this privilege is a per-
sonal one only.' "40
In 1965 the New York Legislature reformulated the elements for
various sex offenses and their respective punishments.4' Defini-
tions were added for the terms "sexual intercourse," "deviate sex-
ual intercourse," "sexual contact," and "female."4 " The definition
for "female," defined as "any female person who is not married to
the actor," perpetuated the marital rape exemption. 3
New York maintained an absolute exemption for rape in mar-
riage until 1978. With the advent of rape reform in the early
1970s,44 the New York Legislature amended the Penal Law4 5 so
40. Id. at 367 (quoting State v. Dowell, 11 S.E. 525, 525 (N.C. 1890)).
41. See Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1469,
1539-47 (1964).
42. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(1)-(4) (McKinney 1967). Section 130.00 pro-
vided in part:
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Sexual intercourse" has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any pene-
tration, however slight.
2. "Deviate sexual intercourse" means sexual conduct between persons not
married to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus,
the mouth and penis, or the mouth and the vulva.
3. "Sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts
of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of gratifying sexual
desire of either party.
4. "Female" means any female person who is not married to the actor.
Subsection (4) is the basis for the marital rape exemption.
43. To avoid repeating the phrase "not married to the actor" in the definitions for
each of the sex offenses, the Legislature added the term "female." N.Y. PENAL LAw,
art. 130, Richard G. Denzer & Peter McQuillan, Practice Commentaries, 268, 271
(McKinney 1967). The Legislature, by adding this term, intended that the Penal Law
protect only those women who were not legally married to the actor; hence, it pro-
tected common-law wives. "[A] man and woman living together as husband and wife,
although not legally married, are not deemed 'married to each other' for purposes of
this article." Id. Although New York is not among them, some states provide an
exemption for a man who is living with a woman, and for a "voluntary social compan-
ion" or date. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 775(a)(2) (1995); ACQUAINTANCE
RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 327 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991)
[hereinafter ACQUAINTANCE RAPE]; Buckborough, supra note 11, at 344 n.7.
44. See CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 20 (1992). Rape law reform began in the early 1970s in
response to both an increasing concern about the number of reported rapes and criti-
cism of traditional rape laws. Id. Women's groups lobbied state legislatures to change
"antiquated rape laws" to reflect the changing status of women in society. Id. Police
and prosecutors joined the effort as the number of reported rapes increased dramati-
cally during the 1960s and 1970s. Id. Most states had reformed their rape laws by the
mid-1980s. Id.
45. See Act of Aug. 7, 1978, ch. 735, 1978 N.Y. Laws 1516. To Penal Law
§ 130.00(4), which states: " 'Female' means any female person who is not married to
the actor," the Legislature added the following:
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that women who were legally separated or had orders of protection
against their husbands received the protection the rape statutes
afforded.46
In 1983, in People v. De Stefano,47 a Suffolk County, New York
court was the first in the country to address the constitutionality of
the marital rape exemption, 8 and found it unconstitutional. 9 The
court found that a woman had a right to "bodily integrity," and
that the marital rape exemption unconstitutionally gave the hus-
band a right to control his wife's body.50  "Even when accom-
For the purposes of this article "not married" means:
(a) the lack of an existing relationship of husband and wife between the
female and the actor which is recognized by law, or
(b) the existence of the relationship of husband and wife between the actor
and the female which is recognized by law at the time the actor commits an
offense proscribed by this article by means of forcible compulsion against the
female, and the female and actor are living apart at such time pursuant to a
valid and effective:
(i) order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction which by its terms or in
its effect requires such living apart, or
(ii) decree or judgment of separation, or
(iii) written agreement of separation subscribed by them and acknowledged
in the form required to entitle a deed to be recorded which contains provi-
sions specifically indicating that the actor may be guilty of the commission of
a crime for engaging in conduct which constitutes an offense proscribed by
this article against and without the consent of the female.
46. See id.
47. 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (County Ct. 1983).
48. See Lisa Dawgert Waggoner, New Mexico Joins the Twentieth Century: The
Repeal of the Marital Rape Exemption, 22 N.M. L. REv. 551, 557 (1992) ("The first
case in the nation to examine the constitutionality of the marital exemption was Peo-
ple v. De Stefano.").
49. De Stefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 516. In De Stefano, the defendant and his wife
separated in 1982 after 14 years of marriage. Id. at 508. Mrs. De Stefano obtained an
order of protection against her husband in November of that year. Id. Three weeks
later De Stefano violated the order of protection by entering the marital home and
forcibly raping his estranged wife at knifepoint. Id. A grand jury indicted De Stefano
for first degree rape. Id. He argued that N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(4)(b)(i), see supra
note 45, was unconstitutional because it violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the New York and Federal Constitutions. Id. at 509. De Stefano contended
that the Penal Law did not require that a court order be served upon the husband nor
did it require a statement that the husband must refrain from sexual intercourse with
his wife. He also argued that the law could not constitutionally exclude a wife sepa-
rated from her husband from the definition of "female." Id. The court reasoned that
if a woman had a unilateral right to use contraceptives, have an abortion, have a
hysterectomy, or be sterilized, she logically had a right to refuse the sexual acts lead-
ing to pregnancy. Id. at 513. Accordingly, the court held that N.Y. Penal Law
§ 130.00(4) was unconstitutional to the extent that it granted a husband immunity
from prosecution for marital rape. Id. at 516.
50. See id. at 514. The court stated: "While recognizing the sanctity of marriage
modern decisional law also recognizes that the right of a wife to supremacy over her
own body is paramount to her spouse's desire. Indeed her rights to individual auton-
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plished behind the veil of a marriage license, [rape] is a crime of
violence not only damaging to the body, but scarring upon the
mind."' 51 One year later, New York's highest court addressed the
constitutionality of the marital rape exemption.
II. People v. Liberta and Its Aftermath
A. People v. Liberta
In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals declared the marital
rape exemption unconstitutional in People v. Liberta .5  The deci-
sion marked the first time that any state's highest court had struck
down an explicit exemption for marital rape. 3
A jury convicted Mario Liberta of first degree rape and first de-
gree sodomy after he raped his wife in violation of an order of
protection. 4 The New York Penal Law treated married couples
omy and to control procreation are but a part of the more comprehensive right to
bodily integrity." Id. (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 512.
52. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 577-78.
53. David Margolick, Top State Court Rules Husbands Can Be Charged in Rape of
Wives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1984, at Al. Prosecutors also predicted that the decision
would have far-reaching effects in other states. David Margolick, New York Joins 17
States That Deny Wives Are Property; Rape in a Marriage is No Longer Within Law,
N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 23, 1984, at E6.
54. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 570. Soon after the birth of their son in 1978, Mario
Liberta began to physically abuse his wife, Denise. Id. at 569. In 1980, Mrs. Liberta
obtained an order of protection against her husband. Id. The court ordered Liberta
to move out of the family home but permitted him to see his son every weekend. Id.
During one weekend in March 1981, Liberta failed to visit his son and called his wife
to ask her to bring the child to the motel where he resided. Id. After being assured
that Liberta's friend would remain with them at all times, Mrs. Liberta agreed to go to
the motel with Liberta and his friend. Id. The friend left soon after arriving back at
the motel and Liberta began to attack his wife. Id He threatened to kill her, raped
and sodomized her in front of their son, and forced his wife to tell the young child to
watch the entire incident. Id. Liberta was indicted under N.Y. Penal Law §§ 130.35
and 130.50. Section 130.35 provided:
"A male is guilty of rape in the first degree when he engages in sexual inter-
course with a female:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. Who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
3. Who is less than eleven years old.
Rape in the first degree is a class B felony."
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 1987). For a discussion of the definition of
"female," see supra note 42 and accompanying text. Section 130.50 provided:
"A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another person: 1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. Who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
3. Who is less than eleven years old.
Sodomy in the first degree is a class B felony."
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who were legally separated, or separated by court order, as "not
married" for purposes of the law.5" Although Liberta was "not
married" within the meaning of the statute, he invoked the marital
exemption. 6
In his appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, Liberta con-
tended that the statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause 7 be-
cause they were underinclusive in two respects: first, the law
allowed only married men who cohabited with their spouses the
right to invoke the marital rape exemption; and second, the law
provided for the prosecution of men alone for committing rapes.18
Therefore, Liberta argued, the statutes burdened him "but not
others similarly situated. 5 9
The Court of Appeals began its opinion with a discussion of the
history of the marital rape exemption. The court noted that courts,
following Sir Matthew Hale, generally assumed that a man could
not be guilty of raping his wife.6'
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.50 (McKinney 1987). For a discussion of the definition of
"deviate sexual intercourse," see supra note 42; infra part III.B.
55. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 570. For a discussion of the term "not married," see
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
56. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 570. The trial court had agreed with Liberta's decision
to invoke the marital exemption and dismissed the indictment. See People v. Liberta,
455 N.Y.S.2d 882, 883 (App. Div. 1982). The trial court reasoned that the order of
protection granted by the family court did not conform to the statutory definition of
"living apart" in N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(4) since it applied to Liberta only and not
his wife. Id. at 883. According to the trial court, an order of protection requiring only
the husband to move out of the marital home fell outside of the scope of orders of
protection contemplated by the 1978 Legislature. Id. The Appellate Division re-
viewed the legislative history of the bill and found that the first version of the bill
referred to both an order of protection issued by a family court requiring the parties
to live apart and to an order issued by the state supreme court directing the wife to
have exclusive occupancy of the marital home. The Legislature expanded the final
version of the bill to include "an order issued by any court which order by its terms or
in its effect requires such living apart." On remand, the trial court convicted Liberta
of first degree rape and sodomy and the Appellate Division affirmed. See People v.
Liberta, 473 N.Y.S.2d 636 (App. Div. 1984), aff'd, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
57. The Equal Protection Clause provides, "nor shall any State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XiV, § 1.
58. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 570. The court gave Liberta standing to challenge the
issue although the state's remedy might not benefit him. The court's decision to ex-
pand coverage to those married men previously excluded gave Liberta a "pyrrhic vic-
tory." Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 235, 256 (1994).
59. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 571.
60. Id. at 572. See also HALE, supra note 28 and accompanying text; BARBOUR,
supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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The court stated that under the Equal Protection Clause, distinc-
tions based on marital status must be rational and reasonable.6 1
The court noted that underlying the traditional rationales for the
distinction between marital and nonmarital rape were "archaic"
ideas of implied consent and property rights that failed to "with-
stand even the slightest scrutiny." 62 According to the court, rape
constituted an act of violence causing severe emotional and physi-
cal trauma, and the notion that anyone would impliedly consent to
such an act was "irrational and absurd. 63
The State in Liberta argued that the marital rape exemption pro-
moted reconciliation and protected married couples from govern-
mental intrusion into their private lives.61 According to the court,
although marital privacy and reconciliation were legitimate state
interests, they provided no rational basis for allowing a husband to
rape his wife.65 The court then addressed other modem rationales
advanced in support of a marital rape exemption. One rationale
offered for retaining an exemption was that proving lack of consent
in marital rape cases would be difficult.66 The court stated that a
prior sexual relationship between the victim and the offender exac-
erbates the difficulty of proving lack of consent in rape cases gener-
ally.67 Another rationale advanced was that other assault statutes
permitted the prosecution of husbands for assaulting their wives. 68
61. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573. The court found that the distinction between mari-
tal and nonmarital rape violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Id. at 575.
62. Id. at 573. See also discussion supra part I.A.
63. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573 ("Other than in the context of rape statutes, mar-
riage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on
demand."). The Court of Appeals invalidated the remaining justifications for the
marital exemption, including the two common law doctrines that a woman was the
property of her husband and that her legal existence merged with his. Id. See also
discussion supra part I.A.
64. Id. at 574. It may be wondered why the State would argue in favor of the
marital rape exemption. The State was concerned that Liberta's facial challenge to
the marital exemption would result in the court's invalidation of the statute and over-
turning of his conviction. Therefore, the State found itself in the uncomfortable posi-
tion of having to argue in favor of a limited exemption for husbands who were not
subject to orders of protection. As it turns out, however, the Court of Appeals totally
invalidated the marital rape exemption and still upheld Liberta's conviction.
65. Id. at 574. According to the court, "[t]he marital exemption simply does not
further marital privacy because this right of privacy protects consensual acts, not vio-
lent sexual assaults." Id.
66. Id. The court also noted the concern that vengeful wives would fabricate rape
complaints. The court concluded, however, that the possibility of fabricating com-
plaints is no greater for women raped by their husbands than for unmarried women.
Id.
67. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
68. Id.
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The court parried that rape laws exist because rape causes more
harm and devastation to the victim than ordinary assault crimes. 69
Having addressed the counterarguments and finding no rational
basis for the exemption, the court held that the marital exemption
for rape is unconstitutional.70
B. Barriers to Prosecuting Marital Rape in the Aftermath of
Liberta
Although New York's highest court unequivocally declared that
marital rape is a crime in New York, many factors prevent this
crime from being adequately addressed. First, courts do not uni-
formly agree with Liberta, most notably the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, which failed to follow the Liberta holding
on the unconstitutionality of the marital rape exemption. 71 Sec-
ond, case law suggests that the courts ambiguously define the re-
quired element of "force" in spousal rape cases. Third, because of
credibility and proof problems, prosecutors often choose not to
prosecute spousal rape cases. Fourth, marital rape prosecutions
often fail to convict because of an entrenched gender bias in the
judiciary, documented by the 1986 New York Task Force on Wo-
men in the Courts.72
69. Id. ("[Tihe harm caused by a forcible rape is different, and more severe, than
the harm caused by an ordinary assault.").
70. Id. at 573. The court stated that although its discussion focused on first degree
rape, its analysis also applied to first degree sodomy as well. Id. at 572 n.3. The court
also held that the rape statute "violate[d] equal protection because it exempt[ed] fe-
males from criminal liability for forcible rape." Id. at 577-78. It noted that histori-
cally, rape statutes only applied to males because the laws protected a woman's
chastity and a man's property rights. Id. at 576. See also discussion supra part I.A.
The court concluded that the State's arguments that: 1) gender-based statutes pro-
tected women from pregnancies as a result of rape, 2) a female faces medical and
psychological problems unique to her gender, and 3) a woman could not physically
rape a man, were unfounded. Id. at 576-77.
Anticipating what the Legislature would have done, the court decided that the most
appropriate remedy for its decision was to extend the statute's coverage to married
men who were living with their wives rather than strike it down. Id. at 578. The court
rejected Liberta's argument that this decision, affirming his conviction while ex-
tending coverage of the statute to those previously excluded, denied him due process.
Id. at 579. Since Liberta fell within the categories of exemptions stricken from the
statute, his conduct was covered by the statute and he received fair warning that his
conduct was criminal. Id. Finding that the ramifications of a reversal of Liberta's
conviction would be far-reaching, the court affirmed his conviction. Id. at 580.
71. See Liberta v. Kelly, 839 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832
(1988).
72. OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, REPORT OF
THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (1986), reprinted in 15
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 11 (1986-87) [hereinafter NEW YORK TASK FORCE].
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1. Federal Court Equivocation
The defendant in People v. Liberta, Mario Liberta, filed a habeas
petition in federal court, seeking to overturn his conviction. The
case, Liberta v. Kelly,7 reached the Second Circuit, which declined
to find the marital rape exemption unconstitutional.74 Liberta ar-
gued that the New York Court of Appeals denied him due process
when it struck down the marital rape exemption, in effect, creating
a new statute, while affirming his convictions. 75 The Second Circuit
did not address the constitutionality of the marital rape exemption,
the privacy issue, or any of the modern justifications for the exemp-
tion as addressed by the New York Court of Appeals.76 Instead, in
dicta, the court noted that the Penal Law's "distinction between
married men who are subject to protective orders and those who
are not 'rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.' 77 The ra-
tional basis is that those husbands subject to orders of protection
are more dangerous than those who are not subject to orders of
protection.78 The court further noted the availability of coercion
statutes to prosecute husbands who raped their wives.79 Nonethe-
73. 657 F. Supp. 1260 (W.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 839 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988).
74. 839 F.2d at 77. Mario Liberta sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Western
District of New York. See Liberta, 657 F. Supp. at 1261. Liberta challenged his con-
viction and the constitutionality of the statute. Id. The court disagreed with Liberta's
contentions and denied his petition. Id. at 1262. Liberta then appealed to the Second
Circuit, which found that the evidence supported the jury decision. See Liberta, 839
F.2d at 80.
75. Liberta, 839 F.2d at 78.
76. The constitutionality of the marital rape exemption was not before the Second
Circuit and it declined to rule on the issue. Id. at 81.
77. Id. at 82 (quoting Hooper v. Bernalilo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618
(1985)). According to the court, states can legitimately distinguish between husbands
who are subject to orders of protection and those who are not since the deterrence of
forcible rape and sodomy is a legitimate state objective. Id.
78. See id. at 82. The Second Circuit opined,
A state is certainly entitled to conclude that a husband already ordered by a
court to live apart from his wife, often as the result of his physically or sexu-
ally abusive conduct, represents a far greater threat to her safety than does a
husband not subject to a protective order. Accordingly, New York might
reasonably have concluded that the law should pose a greater deterrent to
marital rape or sodomy for husbands who are subject to such protective
orders.
Id.
79. Id at 82 n.2. Coercion involves compelling another, by instilling a fear of
harm, to engage in activity in which the latter has a right to refuse. See N.Y. PENAL'
LAW §§ 135.60, 135.65 (McKinney 1987).
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less, the Second Circuit affirmed Liberta's conviction, and found
that he had received due process.8 °
A fair reading of the Second Circuit in Liberta is that the court
simply did not feel it necessary to consider the constitutionality of
the marital exemption.8' The court's focus was narrower: whether
it was appropriate for the State to single out those like Liberta,
who were subject to protection orders. Nonetheless, the Second
Circuit did not go out of its way to embrace the New York court's
facial invalidation of the exemption. This has caused confusion
among lower courts and scholars, and has unfortunately led to con-
tinued reliance by some courts on the marital exemption, at least
where the defendant is not subject to an order of protection. 2
Despite the New York Court of Appeals' decision to strike down
the marital rape exemption, courts continue to apply the exemp-
tion, even when evidence of force or physical injury exists. Liberta
is subject to narrow construction since the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the marital rape exemption only within the context of first
degree rape and first degree sodomy. 3 This narrow construction
has caused procedural confusion among lower courts with respect
80. Liberta, 839 F.2d at 81. According to the court, Liberta received notice "that
his actions were criminal" under the old statute and thus he received due process. Id.
In addition, the Second Circuit disagreed with the New York Court of Appeals on the
issue of whether the rape statutes should be gender-neutral. The Second Circuit
found legitimate reasons for the rape statutes to apply to males only. Id. at 82. The
court found no evidence of females raping males and stated that the "possibility of
female rape does not render Section 130.35 unconstitutional where such events are
virtually or wholly nonexistent." Id. at 83. The court concluded that with respect to
rape, men and women were not similarly situated and the exclusion of women from
the rape statute did "not deny men equal protection." Id.
In a concurring opinion, one judge noted the majority's conclusion that the marital
rape exemption and the gender-based classifications were constitutional. According
to the judge, while the disagreement between the Second Circuit and the New York
Court of Appeals had no effect on Liberta's appeal, "it create[d] confusion concern-
ing the current status of the statutes in question." Id. at 84 (Cardamone, C.J.,
concurring).
81. See id. at 81.
82. See, e.g., Williams v. Lambert, 902 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("It is
significant that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals [that the marital rape
exemption violated the Equal Protection Clause] .. . was subsequently found by the
Second Circuit to be more generous than the Constitution required."); Buckborough,
supra note 11, at 366 ("By remaining silent on the issue of a woman's right to bodily
autonomy, the Second Circuit... decision sets a precedent which favors judicial re-
straint in determining the constitutionality of statutes that limit the liability of hus-
bands who sexually assault their wives.... [Ilt is a strong statement by an influential
federal court to other federal and state courts that they are under no obligation to
take any affirmative constitutional stand that may lead to the overturn of discrimina-
tory laws.").
83. See Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 572 n.3.
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to Liberta's application to other sex offenses.84 Courts have been
forced to decide, based on the facts of each case, whether the mari-
tal exemption is applicable.85
For example, in a recent unpublished opinion, a prosecutor
presented medical evidence that a husband had raped his wife, seri-
ously injured her during several attacks, and charged him with sex-
ual misconduct.86  Nevertheless, relying upon the marital
exemption, the judge dismissed the charges.8 7 According to the
prosecutor, the judge narrowly construed the Liberta decision to
apply to rape and not sexual misconduct, a misdemeanor under the
Penal Law.88
In another case, a jury acquitted a man of the rape and sodomy
of his common-law wife after the trial court instructed the jury that
a rape "victim" was "any female not married to the actor." 89 In a
dissenting opinion, one justice inferred that the jury charge on the
issue of rape probably led the jury to acquit. 90
84. Liberta is procedurally confusing because the defendant did not challenge the
marital rape exemption. Instead he challenged the fact that it was underinclusive in
that he was excluded from the class of husbands who were exempt from prosecution
for raping their wives.
85. See cases cited infra note 101.
86. See Paul Vitello, A Question of Interpretation, NEWSDAY, June 10, 1993, at A8.
In the unpublished opinion, a New York woman accused her husband of rape. The
prosecutor reduced the charges to sexual misconduct. The victim testified at the non-
jury trial that she and her husband had been sleeping in separate bedrooms at the
time of the attacks. Id.
87. Id. ("[T]he defense lawyer asked for a dismissal of the sexual misconduct
charges, based on the marital exemption set forth in Penal Law section 130.00(4).").
The judge dismissed the charges and did not rule on the evidence in the case. Id.
88. Id. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 1987).
89. People v. Guzman, 559 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (App. Div. 1990). In that case, the
jury acquitted the defendant, initially charged with rape, sodomy and kidnapping of
his common-law wife. He was acquitted of the rape and sodomy charges in a jury trial
but convicted of kidnapping and assault. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed
his conviction for kidnapping because the trial court failed to charge the jury with a
presumption of innocence in its final instructions. Id. at 551. According to the court,
the jury saw the issue of credibility as a close one because it acquitted the defendant
of rape and sodomy while convicting him for kidnapping. Id.
90. Id. at 552 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). "[T]he court, in charging on the sex of-
fenses, defined a victim as 'any female who is not married to the actor.' In that re-
gard, the court also defined the relationship of husband and wife as one 'which may
be recognized by law.' Thus, the jury might well have excluded the complainant from
the protected class for whom the rape and sodomy statutes were intended." Id. See
also Denzer & McQuillan, supra note 43, at 271 (discussing the New York Legisla-
ture's intent to protect women not legally married to the actor). The provisions of the
statute as written prior to Liberta, presumably protected common-law wives.
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2. A Definition of "Force"
The common law approach to rape focused not on the offender's
forceful conduct but on the victim's lack of consent.9' A victim had
to show that she resisted her attacker to the "utmost" 92 to prove
that she did not consent to unwanted sex.93 Although force, or the
threat of force, was generally an element of the crime of rape, cases
often turned on the thorny issue of the victim's lack of consent. 94
The authors of the Model Penal Code, in drafting the Code's
proposed sex crimes laws, attempted to shift the emphasis from the
victim's lack of consent to the offender's forceful conduct.9 5 The
New York Legislature followed the Model Penal Code's lead, re-
91. See Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Con-
duct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 399, 399
(1988) ("[Ejmphasis on the woman's consent, and the methods of proving it cause
rape trials to differ substantially from other criminal trials which focus on the conduct
of the defendant."). In 1965, the New York Legislature made "lack of consent" an
element of all sex offenses in the Penal Law. See Morris Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the
New Penal Law, 32 BROOK. L. REV. 274, 276 (1966).
92. See People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 382-83 (1874). In early New York law, a
female rape victim had to use "utmost resistance," or all of her power to resist her
attacker. "The resistance must be up to the point of being overpowered by actual
force, or of inability from loss of strength longer to resist, or from the number of
persons attacking resistance must be dangerous or absolutely useless, or there must be
duress or fear of death .... But whatever the circumstances may be, there must be
the greatest effort of which she is capable therein, to foil the pursuer and preserve the
sanctity of her person." Id.
93. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2010 (Consol. 1909) (defining rape as an act of sexual
intercourse perpetrated against a female "[w]hen her resistance is forcibly over-
come"). For a discussion of § 2010, see supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also
John Dwight Ingram, Date Rape: It's Time for "No" to Really Mean "No", 21 AM. J.
CRiM. L. 3, 12 (1993) ("Th[e] pervasive distrust of a rape accuser's testimony accounts
for the requirement that there not only be evidence of force by the attacker, but also
that the victim's nonconsent be proved by evidence of her physical resistance.");
Wicktom, supra note 91, at 403-04 ("Courts in the United States ordinarily require
the state to prove nonconsent by showing that the victim physically resisted the
rape.").
94. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 59 (1987) ("The requirement of force is not
new to the law of rape .... Yet so long as the focus was on female nonconsent,
defined as utmost or at least reasonable resistance, force was a decidedly secondary
issue and remained essentially unaddressed.").
95. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 2, at 279 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980). Section 213.1(a) provides: "A male who has sexual intercourse
with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if: (a) he compels her to submit by force or
by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be
inflicted on anyone .... ." § 213.1(a). The purpose of this section was "to meet [the]
difficulties [in defining "force"] in the most serious form of rape by focusing upon
objective manifestations of aggression by the actor." § 213.1 cmt. 2, at 280. More-
over, the authors criticized the New York statute for its use of the resistance require-
ment in defining forcible compulsion. See § 213.1 cmt. 3(b), at 288 ("The focus of the
New York statute on the 'earnest resistance' of the victim in the definition of 'forcible
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pealing the common law "resistance" requirement in 1982.96 De-
spite the shift in focus from the victim's to the offender's behavior,
most rape statutes still require both elements of nonconsent and
force.97
Some have argued that the standard of force used in rape cases is
a standard defined by men.98 This male standard offers the
compulsion' . . . seems an unwarranted emphasis on the degree of the victim's resist-
ance rather than the degree of force employed by the actor.").
96. See N.Y. PENAL LAW, art. 130, William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries,
566, 568 (McKinney 1987). The New York Legislature amended the definition of for-
cible compulsion three times. The 1965 law defined forcible compulsion as "'physical
force that overcomes earnest resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a
person in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury . . . .'" lId After the
Appellate Division required that a victim use resistance "to the utmost limit of her
power" in People v. Yanik, 390 N.Y.S.2d 98, 101 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd, 371 N.E.2d
497 (N.Y. 1977), the Legislature amended the statute in 1977 to read that" '[f]orcible
compulsion means physical force which is capable of overcoming earnest resistance
.... '" Donnino, supra at 568. The Legislature explained that futile attempts to resist
an attacker significantly increased a victim's chances of serious injury and possibly
death. Recognizing however, that some courts might interpret the statute to require
earnest resistance, the Legislature repealed the "earnest resistance" requirement in
1982. Id. at 569. It defined forcible compulsion as "'physical force or a threat, ex-
press or implied, which force or threat places a person in fear of immediate death or
serious physical injury .... .'" I The Legislature realized that the statute required
that the physical force place the victim in fear of death or serious injury and amended
the statute a third time in 1983 allowing forcible compulsion to result exclusively from
the use of physical force or the threat of physical force. Id See generally Margaret A.
Clemens, Note, Elimination of the Resistance Requirement and Other Rape Law Re-
forms: The New York Experience, 47 ALB. L. REV. 871 (1983) (discussing the New
York Legislature's repeal of the "earnest resistance" requirement).
97. See Remarks of Robin West in Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
125, 149 (1994) [hereinafter Men, Women and Rape] ("Most states presently require
two things for sex to be rape: nonconsent and force. If both are present, there is a
rape. If one but not the other is present, there is no crime. Thus, if there is considera-
ble force but consent, there is no rape. On the other hand, perhaps more importantly,
if there is clearly no consent but the defendant has accomplished his end without
using force, then again there is no rape."); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Es-
say on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1784 (1992) (stating that "[e]ven in the reform jurisdictions,
force remains an element and consent remains a defense").
The New York statute provides that lack of consent may result from 1) forcible
compulsion, 2) incapacity to consent, or in the case of sexual abuse 3) the victim's
failure to "expressly or impliedly acquiesce in the actor's conduct" in addition to one
of the other aforementioned elements. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2) (McKinney
1987). "'Forcible compulsion' means to compel by either: a) use of physical force; or
b) a threat, express or implied, which places a person in fear of immediate death or
physical injury to himself, herself or another person, or in fear that he, she or another
person will immediately be kidnapped." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney
1987).
98. See ESTRIcH, supra note 94, at 60 (finding that "[m]ost of the time a criminal
law that reflects male views and male standards imposes its judgment on men who
874 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
predominantly male legal system little insight into the trauma suf-
fered by rape victims.99
The element of force is generally more difficult for the state to
prove in nonstranger rape cases. 1°° In marital and acquaintance
have injured other men"). Rape, however, is a crime primarily committed by men
against women and it is crucial to decide whose standard of force should be used. Id.
99. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth
of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 439, 441 (1993) ("[A] male-defined
concept of violence-a concept of violence premised on a school yard fist fight or a
barroom brawl-and lack of knowledge about rape trauma produce erroneous
sentences for rapists."). See also People v. Huurre, 603 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 1993)
(reversing defendant's conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree after finding
that "profoundly mentally retarded" victim possessed the ability to communicate an
unwillingness to engage in sexual conduct), aff'd, 645 N.E.2d 1210 (N.Y. 1994). In
Huurre, the victim, a 35-year-old woman, had an IQ functionally equivalent to that of
a three-year-old child. Id. at 180. She also suffered from cerebral palsy and epilepsy
rendering her unable to verbally communicate. Id. The court concluded that the vic-
tim had the ability to communicate her unwillingness to be subjected to the hospital
examination following the assault and thus, she was capable of communicating her
lack of consent to the defendant's sexual conduct. Id. at 181. See generally LEE
MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTINUED BE-
TRAYAL OF THE VIcTIM (1991) (discussing the subsequent victimization of rape vic-
tims by the system).
100. See ESTRICH, supra note 94, at 60. In nonstranger rapes involving no weapons,
courts often make a distinction between "force" that is merely incidental to inter-
course and the "force" necessary to convict one of rape. Id. In the aggravated cases,
those involving weapons and threats of injury, the weapons constitute force. "[E]ven
force that goes far beyond the physical contact necessary to accomplish penetration-
is not itself prohibited. What is required, and prohibited, is force used to overcome
female nonconsent. The prohibition of 'force' or 'forcible compulsion' ends up being
defined in terms of a woman's resistance." Id. See also, People v. Gibbs, 628
N.Y.S.2d 296 (App. Div. 1995) (reversing defendant's conviction for sexual abuse in
the first degree and ordering a new trial for forcibly fondling the breasts of the com-
plainant while they were out on a date); People v. Daniels, 627 N.Y.S.2d 483 (App.
Div. 1995) (reversing defendant's conviction for rape of three victims after consolidat-
ing trials in which the details of the first two rapes differed significantly from the third
rape thereby prejudicing the defendant and noting that no weapons were used, the
victims "voluntarily" got into defendant's car, "spent time socializing with him," de-
fendant permitted each victim "to get dressed" and then drove her to a destination of
her choice). Compare Guzman, 559 N.Y.S.2d 550 (affirming defendant's acquittal of
rape and sodomy charges of common-law wife after pulling her hair, dragging her to
an abandoned apartment, keeping her for more than 24 hours, and sexually assaulting
her) with People v. Wakefield, 617 N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming defend-
ant's conviction for rape and sodomy after telling the victim he had a gun, pulling her
hair, putting her into his closet, and sexually assaulting her), appeal denied, 647
N.E.2d 134 (N.Y. 1994). But cf. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992) (holding
that force is used in rape cases when sexual penetration is "accomplished without the
affirmative and freely-given permission of the alleged victim"). In that case, the 17-
year-old defendant was charged with raping the 15-year-old victim. Id. at 1269. Sex-
ual penetration occurred after consensual kissing and petting. The victim admitted
that she had not been injured in any other way. Id. at 1268. The issue before the
1996] MARITAL EXEMPTION 875
rapes, a defendant is usually acquitted unless his conduct was un-
questionably brutal.10 1
Some commentators advocate a standard based solely on the vic-
tim's nonconsent. 10 2 Undoubtedly, a standard of force for rape
based solely on the victim's lack of consent presents unique
problems in marital rape cases. 0 3 One commentator notes that re-
formers have "characterize[d] as marital rape occasions when the
court was whether force constituted any amount of unwanted sexual touching or
whether it required the power necessary to overcome a lack of consent. Id. at 1269.
101. ESTRICH, supra note 94, at 78 ("[I]n ... jurisdictions like New York that at
least hold all men to the formal possibility of conviction for wife rape it seems that a
wife rape must be aggravated in every respect other than the identity of the rapist to
qualify as a real rape."). See also, People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(affirming defendant's conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault for forcing his
fist into his wife's vagina), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 467 (11. 1992); People v. Staple-
ton, 612 N.Y.S.2d 178 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming defendant's conviction for first de-
gree rape and sodomy after handcuffing girlfriend to pole, tearing off her clothes,
raping and sodomizing her, whipping her with electrical cord, sticking pins in her legs
and burning her), appeal denied, 642 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1994); Olivia Winslow, LI Man
Guilty of Rape, Murder of Wife in Vt., NEWSDAY, Aug. 5, 1995, at A8 (reporting a
Long Island, New York man's conviction in Vermont for murder and rape of his wife
after he strangled her and "sodomized her so violently that she would have needed
stitches [had she survived]").
New York courts convicted husbands of marital rape in most cases in which the
defendants used brutal force or weapons to sexually assault their wives. See, e.g.,
People v. Van Steenburg, 633 N.Y.S.2d 867 (App. Div. 1995) (affirming defendant's
conviction for first degree rape of his estranged wife at gunpoint); People v. Arhin,
609 N.Y.S.2d 604 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming defendant's conviction after brutal rape
of his pregnant wife and threatening her with knife), appeal denied, 637 N.E.2d 281
(N.Y. 1994); People v. DeLarosa, 568 N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 1991) (affirming de-
fendant's conviction for attempted rape and sexual abuse after beating wife and beat-
ing her friend with a hammer), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1991); People v.
Bruce, 556 N.Y.S.2d 782 (App. Div. 1990) (affirming defendant's conviction for at-
tempted first degree rape after punching estranged wife in face and back of head
causing her to lose consciousness and threatening to force her to jump out of win-
dow), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 893 (N.Y. 1990); De Stefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (con-
victing defendant of raping estranged wife at knifepoint); James, supra note 3
(discussing facts of case in which defendant was convicted of raping and sodomizing
wife at knifepoint and breaking her ankle during the attack). But cf. People v. Naylor,
609 N.Y.S.2d 954 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming defendant's conviction for sexual abuse
in the third degree after fondling estranged wife's breasts and genitals despite lack of
force), appeal denied, 642 N.E.2d 335 (N.Y. 1994). See discussion infra notes 109-13
and accompanying text.
102. See Men, Women and Rape, supra note 97, at 149 (noting the feminists have
argued that "all non-consensual sex should be understood as rape and prosecuted as
such").
103. See John D. Harman, Consent, Harm, and Marital Rape, 22 J. FAM. L. 423, 429
(1983-84) ("The idea that adequate reform of the marital exemption must criminalize
all intercourse but that expressly consented to leads to difficulties that detract from
the effort to protect women from domestic violence-the professed goal of most
reformers.").
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wife is 'coerced' into unwanted sex by threats to leave, to cut off
her source of money or to humiliate her in some way."' 4 He sug-
gests that reformers who advocate characterizing rape as any inter-
course to which the wife does not expressly consent, shift the focus
from an act of violence to one of "unwanted sex.' a05 Critics must
distinguish between the stereotypical scenario in which a wife first
declines to have sex and later indulges her husband,0 6 and those
situations in which women suffer from real harm and violence. 107
The legal system can, however, effectively protect victims without
opening the floodgates to frivolous litigation. 108 In People v. Nay-
lor,109 for example, a jury convicted an estranged husband of sexual
abuse in the third degree' 10 after he sexually assaulted his sleeping
wife."' Although the act involved no force, 112 the court found that
the victim's lack of consent was sufficient to constitute a crime.11 3
104. Id. at 430.
105. Id.
106. See Raquel K. Bergen, Surviving Wife Rape: How Women Define and Cope
With the Violence, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 117, 120 (1995) ("Within larger soci-
ety, there is often an understanding that wife rape is a relatively innocuous incident in
which a husband wants to have sex, his wife rejects him, and he holds her down on the
bed and has intercourse with her.... [T]his scenario was far from the norm.").
107. See ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 43, at 328 (noting that many marital
rapes take place in an environment of domestic violence); Bergen, supra note 106, at
121 (stating that for many women physical violence accompanies sexual assault); Jac-
quelyn C. Campbell & Peggy Alford, The Dark Consequences of Marital Rape, 89
AM. J. NURSING 946, 947 (July 1989) (finding that marital rape victims report "being
forced into homosexual sex, sex with animals, prostitution, public exposure, and other
acts of extreme degradation").
108. See Augustine, supra note 28, at 577 ("[T]he unfortunate reality is that even
with the abrogation of the marital rape exemption, many spousal rapes will never be
reported [and] [s]tates that have abolished the exemption have not experienced an
unmanageable amount of spousal rape cases.").
109. 609 N.Y.S.2d 954.
110. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (McKinney 1987). This section provides in part:
"A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when he subjects another per-
son to sexual contact without the latter's consent . . . " Id.
111. Naylor, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 954. In Naylor, the defendant broke into his estranged
wife's apartment while she was asleep and began to fondle her breasts and genitals.
Id. at 955. He was convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree. The defendant
argued that his conviction was improper because he and the victim were married at
the time of the incident and not legally separated. The Appellate Division found that
"the marital exemption is also inapplicable to a crime which does not have force as a
predicate, but is based upon lack of consent alone." Id.
112. The court stated that forcible compulsion need not be proven for sexual abuse
in the third degree. Id. At the State's request, the jury was instructed that if the
victim did not explicitly acquiesce in the defendant's conduct, the jury could return a
guilty verdict. Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)(c).
113. Naylor, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 955. The Appellate division found that in those cases
in which the couple is estranged, the Liberta rationale applies. The court noted that
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3. Prosecutorial Discretion and Marital Rape
"Prosecutorial discretion" refers to a prosecutor's power to de-
cide whether to seek a conviction in a given case." 4 Several factors
might influence a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute a marital
rape case. Those factors include the victim's reluctance to pro-
ceed," 5 lack of corroboration," 6 victim credibility," 7 and public
skepticism about the crime of marital rape." 8 When prosecutors
continually refuse to prosecute marital rape cases, law enforcement
concludes that these acts are not worth the time and effort required
to make arrests." 9 Moreover, prosecutorial reluctance to proceed
with these cases diminishes judicial exposure to the recurrence of
spousal rape.' 20
Prosecutors often choose not to file charges in marital rape cases
because the victim refuses to testify against her husband. 12
the parties were living in separate residences, had become involved in new relation-
ships, and had taken steps to obtain a divorce but lacked the funds. Id. See Gary
Spencer, Appeals Court Extends Voiding of Marital Exemption, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8,
1994, at 1. Although the court limited its holding to situations where the parties are
estranged, the decision represents a starting point.
114. See Jane W. Ellis, Prosecutorial Discretion to Charge in Cases of Spousal As-
sault: A Dialogue, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 56, 58 (1984). Limited funds, a
need for prosecutors to evaluate each case on its own merits, and the interests of the
public and the criminal justice system are some of the reasons given for a prosecutor's
power to charge. Id. at 59-60. In Manhattan District Attorney's Office, assistant dis-
trict attorneys "interview the arresting officer, assess the evidence, determine the
charges on which defendants are arraigned, and dismiss those cases where criminal
prosecution is unwarranted." Robert M. Morgenthau, The Appropriate Use of
Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 1988, at 1.
115. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Linsky, Chief, Child Abuse and Sex Crimes
Bureau, Westchester County District Attorney's Office (Dec. 18, 1995) (stating that in
most marital rape cases, the victim's reluctance to go forward factors into a prosecu-
tor's decision to proceed with the case).
116. See Charles R. Jeffords, Prosecutorial Discretion in Cases of Marital Rape, 9
VIcrIMoLoGY: INT'L J. 415, 423 (1985).
117. See Schelong, supra note 4, at 111 (noting that some prosecutors treat state-
ments made by abused women against their husbands with suspicion).
118. See Augustine, supra note 28, at 588-89 (stating that a jury's reluctance to con-
vict husbands is probably based upon the public perception that marital rape is an
impossibility).
119. See Ellis, supra note 114, at 58.
120. See id. A prosecutor's decision to charge an offender in spousal assault cases is
crucial to the complete elimination of the marital exemption. See id. at 58-59. See
also Schelong, supra note 4, at 110 ("The marital rape exemption will never be truly
abrogated and domestic abuse uniformly punished until prosecutors pursue criminal
charges.").
121. See Schelong, supra note 4, at 111. See also James, supra note 3, at B5 ("In all
but a few [marital rape] cases, the men are not convicted, often because the woman
decides not to pursue the case.").
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Although a victim's reluctance to testify is generally a problem in
most rape cases, marital rape victims are even more reluctant to
proceed for many reasons. 122 Unsuccessful prosecution, they often
assume, will leave them living unprotected with an angry spouse. 12 3
Many women depend on their husbands for financial support. 1 4
Marital rape prosecutions also often founder because the victims
themselves fail to perceive marital rape as a crime. 25
Victim credibility also persuades many prosecutors not to prose-
cute marital rape cases. 126 The general suspicion is that vindictive-
ness motivates victims who seek prosecution. 127 In acquaintance
rape cases, which account for more than eighty percent of rape
cases, 128 the defense focuses on the victim's credibility. 29 Without
corroborating evidence, a prosecutor's decision to press charges
122. See Jeffords, supra note 116, at 422.
123. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION & THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, THE JUDGE'S BOOK 111-12 (2d ed. 1994)
[hereinafter THE JUDGE'S BOOK] (finding that judges need to be aware of some of the
reasons why women withdraw complaints filed against their husbands including fam-
ily and church pressure, economic dependency and increased violence by the
husband).
124. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Friel, Deputy Unit Chief, New York
County District Attorney's Office (Nov. 30, 1995). According to one New York
County assistant district attorney, victims in marital rape cases are reluctant to pro-
ceed because, either they do not want husbands charged with a serious crime such as
rape or they are reluctant to send them to jail because they are financially dependent.
Id.
125. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Linsky, supra note 115 (stating that victims
are unaware that marital rape is a crime). See also Telephone Interview with Lisa
Friel, supra note 124 (stating that initially most victims contact law enforcement after
a physical assault and prosecutors later discover that marital rape is a part of an over-
all pattern of spousal abuse); Caher, supra note 1, at Al (quoting an Albany County
Rape Crisis Center director who stated that marital rape victims do not describe the
behavior they are subjected to as rape, but describe other abuses).
126. See Schelong, supra note 4, at 111. If the victim is credible, prosecutors will
seek an indictment in marital rape cases. The problem lies not with the prosecutor in
deciding whether to charge, but in convincing the trier of fact that a rape occurred.
Telephone Interview with Lisa Friel, supra note 124.
127. See Schelong, supra note 4, at 116 (arguing that "a significant element in laws
(and attitudes) condoning marital rape" is the general belief that women are vindic-
tive liars).
128. Symposium, Guns at Home, Guns on the Street: An International Perspective,
Remarks of Linda Fairstein in Family Violence in the United States and Abroad, 15
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 229, 231 (1995) [hereinafter Family Violence]. These
categories include marital rape, incest, casual acquaintance rape and professional
rape. Id. at 232.
129. Id. (noting that nonstranger rape cases do not overwhelmingly result in convic-
tions because juries, persuaded by the defense, do not believe victims).
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becomes complicated. 130  Prosecutors often require a greater
amount of evidence in cases involving victims of domestic violence
than in those cases involving violence between strangers.131 Mari-
tal rape, like domestic violence, rarely occurs in the presence of
witnesses. 32 Prosecutors face the difficult task of convincing a jury
that a rape occurred. 33 If additional evidence boosts the victim's
credibility, the prosecutor might then proceed. 34
The public perception that marital rape is less severe than
nonmarital rape also factors into a prosecutor's decision not to go
forward with the case. 135 Many people differentiate between mari-
tal and nonmarital rape, and would more ,likely accept a law
criminalizing marital rape that punished it less severely than stran-
ger rape. 136 Many who would stop short of invoking Hale's notion
of "implied consent"' 37 to rape would nevertheless consider a mari-
tal rape victim who remains with an abusive spouse, to have taken
some responsibility for her situation, and are accordingly less sym-
130. Judith A. Lincoln, Note, Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First
Step in Protecting Married Women from Spousal Rape, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1219, 1248
(1989). Corroboration rules in rape cases developed from a general distrust of wo-
men. See RUSSELL, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that at one time juries were routinely
instructed that the charge of rape was easy to make but difficult to defend against).
131. See Schelong, supra note 4, at 111 ("Greater levels of proof are often required
to support charges of domestic abuse rather than those required in cases of violence
between strangers."); Jeffords, supra note 116, at 423 (stating that prosecutors were
reluctant to file charges based solely on the complainant's word).
132. See Lincoln, supra note 130, at 1248.
133. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Friel, supra note 124. A prosecutor's deci-
sion to proceed will not necessarily result in a grand jury indictment. In one New
York case, a marital rape victim testified at a grand jury hearing that after her hus-
band moved out of their home by court order of protection, he raped her in front of
their two young children. See Caher, supra note 1, at Al. The defendant denied the
charges and eventually pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor contempt charge for violat-
ing the court order of protection. Id The prosecutor, who felt she had a good case,
said the case was an example of the difficulties prosecutors face in bringing marital
rape charges. Id. According to one prosecutor, the general attitude is that " 'a man
can do whatever he wants to his wife."' Id. See Alan Abrahamson, Defendant Says
He Has Right to Sex With Wife, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at B1 (reporting that man
accused 'of attempting to rape his wife said that his religion gave him the right to have
sex with his wife).
134. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Friel, supra note 124. Prosecutors recog-
nize that victims are reluctant and embarrassed to tell anyone about the rape. If,
however, they have told a friend or family member about the incident, it makes the
case stronger. Id.
135. Jeffords, supra note 116, at 423. One Westchester County assistant district at-
torney stated that her office will seek an indictment for first degree rape where legally
sufficient evidence exists and will prosecute if the grand jury hands down an indict-
ment. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Linsky, supra note 115.
136. Jeffords, supra note 116, at 423.
137. See HALE, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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pathetic to her plight than to that of stranger rape victims. 138
Although marital rapes are easier to investigate because victims
can readily identify their assailants, victims undoubtedly face a
more difficult process in the criminal justice system because of pub-
lic attitudes.139
4. Gender Bias in New York's Courts
Judges should decide cases without bias or prejudice. 140 In 1986,
however, the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts
("Task Force") concluded that women litigants, especially poor and
minority women,' 4' lacked full access to the courts, encountered
judges and juries that questioned their credibility, and faced a judi-
ciary that had no knowledge of issues that were important to wo-
men.142 The Task Force concluded that gender bias pervades New
York's court system.
Task forces across the country discovered that gender bias un-
dermines women's credibility. 43 "[B]oth women and men perceive
138. See Family Violence, supra note 128, at 232 ("[In nonstranger rape cases], the
defense still blames the victim for some aspect of the crime that makes it a victim-
precipitated case: it happened because of something she did to encourage or allow
the attack to occur.").
139. Id.
140. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3(B)(5) (1990). It provides:
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, mani-
fest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others
subject to the judge's direction and control to do so.
141. Although not specifically addressed in the Task Force Report, battered women
reportedly encountered judicial actions that varied depending upon the victim's race
or class. See Sarah Eaton & Ariella Hyman, The Domestic Violence Component of the
New York Task Force Report on Women in the Courts: An Evaluation and Assessment
of New York City Courts, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 391, 407 (1992). Judges also lacked
an awareness of the racism faced by women of color in the courts. Id.
142. See NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 72, at 26-27. The gender bias task
force movement began in the early 1980s. The New York Task Force set out to inves-
tigate gender bias in New York courts. Its many activities included a review of a
number of articles on women in the courts, four public hearings, and regional meet-
ings with judges and attorneys. Id. at 19-21. The Task Force also conducted a survey
of attorneys to obtain their views and experiences on gender bias in the courts. Id. at
23. The Task Force found that myths about women's roles in the family and society
affected judicial decisions. See id. at 27. Women had difficulty effectively pleading
their cases because they could not afford to retain counsel and they faced an inhospi-
table environment in the courthouse in which they were dismissed as "burdensome
children" or disrespected as "sexual objects." Id.
143. THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 109 ("In the courts gender bias distorts
decision making and creates a courtroom environment that undermines women's
credibility.").
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females, as a group, as less credible than males."'" In rape cases,
the victim's credibility suffered if she knew the rapist.145 In New
York, for example, juries were found to be extremely skeptical of
the alleged rape victim's credibility.146 This led juries to make deci-
sions, not based wholly on the merits of the case, but on prejudicial
views about sex roles and women's subordination to men in mar-
riage.147 Although thousands of battered women seek protection
from abuse each year, they face courts that trivialize the abusive
situation. 148
The New York Task Force also found that judges lacked an un-
derstanding of the nature of domestic violence. 149 Some judges
even required visible physical injuries before granting orders of
protection to victims of spousal abuse. 150 This lack of understand-
144. Id. at 110. Credibility is essential for all participants in the legal process. Re-
search shows that women continue to be perceived "as no more credible than children
in the context of judicial decision making." Id.
145. Id. at 114-15. Since most rapes occurred between people who knew one an-
other, this fact was significant and disturbing. Id. at 115. The New York Task Force
recommended that judges become familiar with the nature of rape and the serious-
ness of acquaintance rape. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 72, at 63.
146. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 72, at 53. Juries were found to presup-
pose that women invite sexual assault. Id.
147. Id. at 27.
148. THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 111. Courts treat these matters as
family problems that should be resolved outside the courtroom setting. In a recent
New York domestic violence case, Judge Lorin Duckman freed Benito Oliver, a con-
victed rapist, after his former girlfriend, Galina Komar, sought protection from the
court. Oliver later killed Komar. See Don Van Natta Jr., Judge Under Challenge is an
Eccentric Idealist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at B3. The judge reportedly believed
that Oliver would leave Komar alone if she returned his dog to him. "Komar later
told prosecutors that the judge cared more about the dog than her." Id.
149. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 72, at 31. Judges failed to recognize bat-
tered women's syndrome. Oftentimes battered women withdraw their complaints re-
sulting in the court's frustration and a perception that women are indecisive and
manipulative. THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 111-12.
150. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 72, at 31. This requirement poses partic-
ular problems for African-American women whose bruises may not be as visible. In
addition, there is a presumption that violence is normal in the African-American com-
munity. "Clearly this attitude subverts equal protection of the law and exposes black
women to life-threatening assaults." THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 113. See
also Schafran, supra note 99, at 443 (noting that in one New York rape case, the judge
accepted the absence of bruises, scratches and genital lesions as proof that the victim
was not violently raped); Don Van Natta Jr., Judge Rebuked After a Woman is Slain,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at B3 (quoting Brooklyn Judge Lorin Duckman's response
to prosecutors who argued that a convicted rapist who beat his former girlfriend
should remain in prison) (" 'I am not suggesting that bruising is nice, but there is no
disfigurement. There are no broken bones. There are no serious physical injury
charges, are there?' ").
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ing, coupled with the victim's psychological state, prevented wo-
men from receiving the relief they sought. 51
Prosecutors continue to treat rape victims as if they are on
trial.' 52 Judges allow improper questioning of the victim's sexual
behavior and lifestyle.153 The New York Task Force recommended
that judges understand the difference between cross-examination
that protects defendants' rights and improper questioning and har-
assment of rape victims.' 54
Community bias against rape victims translates into juror bias in
the courtroom. 55 The defense attorney's stereotypical portrayal of
the victim often influences jurors.156 Moreover, judges occasionally
allow their own biases to appear in a jury charge. 57
To ensure that New York's marital rape victims receive the full
protection Liberta affords, courts must eliminate the gender bias
that pervades the legal system. Gender bias affects not only judi-
cial decisions but the treatment of domestic violence and rape vic-
151. See NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 72, at 31. Moreover, judges failed to
sanction batterers even in cases of severe injuries. THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note
123, at 112.
152. THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 114.
153. Id. This subtle questioning results in an impeachment of the victim's
credibility.
154. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 72, at 63.
155. See THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 114. Jurors often "'held sex-role
conservative attitudes.' " Id. (quoting Gary LaFree & Barbara Reskin, Structural
Analysis of Jurors' Verdict in Rape Trials: Final Report to the National Institute of
Mental Health, Grant #RO1 MH 29727 8 (1985)). Jurors believe that "nice girls" are
not raped and women with active sex lives invite rape. NEW YORK TASK FORCE,
supra note 72, at 54 (citations omitted).
156. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 72, at 56. A defense based on stereo-
types leads to acquittals based on bias not on the evidence.
157. One Westchester County prosecutor reported that she does not generally see
gender bias against the victim in the courtroom. She stated that occasionally, how-
ever, a prosecutor will encounter a judge who is biased against marital rape victims
and such bias may result in the defendant's choice to proceed with a non-jury trial,
ultimately resulting in dismissal of the case. Telephone Interview with Lisa Linsky,
supra note 115. See also Telephone Interview with Lisa Friel, supra note 124 (noting
that some judges have the attitude that marital rape is not a crime and they subtly
convey those feelings to the jury); THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 131 (finding
"that judicial beliefs about guilt or innocence seemed to 'leak' to the juries in purely
nonverbal forms of communication") (footnote omitted).
A New York County prosecutor stated that gender bias in the courts has improved
in the last ten years. As younger judges are elected, they are more likely to charge
juries on the law without influence. Telephone Interview with Lisa Friel, supra note
124. But cf Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1063, 1067 (1995) (noting that despite the hope that younger judges will not manifest
gender bias in the courtroom, some judges still fail to protect domestic violence vic-
tims by giving favorable treatment to offenders).
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tims in. the courts.158 Gender bias impedes the efficacy of major
law reforms affecting rights for women. 159 Cultural stereotypes
that sanction abuse and treat wives as chattel influence judicial de-
cisions.161 Similarly, bias against domestic violence victims reflects
the historical treatment of women as property.1 61 Although rape
laws that historically discouraged the prosecution of rape offenders
have changed, bias against victims, especially victims of marital
rape, remains. 162 One way to ensure that judges do not rely on the
statutory language to dismiss sexual assault cases involving married
persons, is to explicitly repeal the marital exemption for all sex
offenses.
III. A Call for Statutory Reform
A. The Importance of Legislative Action
Opponents of a statutory amendment might argue that Liberta
repealed the marital rape exemption, rendering legislative action
unnecessary. Nevertheless rape law reformers argue that legisla-
tive action represents a change in policy that is publicly visible. 63
Visible legal changes influence public attitudes toward criminal
acts.16  Moreover, a statutory amendment ensures that a judge
158. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 41 (1994) ("The
literature on the topic is replete with accounts of cases in which judges blame the
victim for inviting the violence while forgiving the offender.").
159. THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 109 ("[L]aws are only as effective as
the judges who interpret and enforce them.").
160. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Overwhelming Evidence: Reports on Gender Bias in
the Courts, 26 TRIAL 28, 30 (Feb. 1990).
161. See id. See also discussion supra part I.A.
162. See THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 123, at 109. See also Schafran, supra note
160, at 30. In rape cases, the victim continues to be put .on trial. Her conduct and
dress are the focus rather than the offender's behavior. Id. Moreover, nonstranger
rapes are "still minimized and trivialized." Id.
163. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 44, at 175. Some who have studied rape law
reforms concluded that the new laws had little impact. For example, despite the re-
peal of corroboration and resistance requirement laws, the presence of both is essen-
tial to obtaining rape convictions. Id. at 162. Advocates of rape law reform argue,
however, that while legislation does not provide complete solutions to problems of
rape law, legislation establishes a policy that the law supports the rape victim. This
policy in turn, influences public attitudes toward the victim. JEANNE C. MARSH ET
AL., RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 4 (1982).
164. Despite the different strategies used to address the rape problem, legislative
reform is still the "strategy of choice." MARSH, supra note 163, at 2. The law is "an
instrument of social change" and "a means by which groups and organizations can
participate in the determination of public policy." ld.
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cannot rely on the current statutory language to dismiss a case.165
If one case is dismissed based on the exemption, that is one case
too many. 166
B. An Analysis of the Proposed Statute
In 1986 the New York State Law Revision Commission ("Com-
mission") issued a report recommending that the Legislature cod-
ify Liberta.67 The Commission recommended that the Legislature
repeal certain sections of article 130 of the New York Penal Law
containing a marital exemption and redefine some terms in gender-
neutral language. The following proposed statute incorporates
some of the Commission's recommendations and includes some
statutory language from other state statutes for sex offenses that
contain no marital exemption. The proposed statute also redefines
several terms in the current Penal Law and repeals others. Its fun-
damental purpose is to delete all references to the marital exemp-
tion for sex offenses.
In the "Definitions of Terms" section of the proposed statute,
the term "sexual penetration" replaces the current Penal Law
terms "sexual intercourse" and "deviate sexual intercourse.'
'1 68
"Deviate sexual intercourse," which the Penal Law defines as "sex-
ual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting
of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or
the mouth and the vulva," incorporates the marital exemption.
169
The Commission recommended that the marital exemption be
165. Telephone Interview with Lisa Friel, supra note 124 (noting that the statute
should explicitly state the law). See also Vitello, supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
166. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Friel, supra note 124.
167. STATE OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMM'N, RE-
PORT TO THE 209TH GEN. ASSEMBLY (1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION]. Senate Bill
No. 9348 was referred to the Committee on Rules on June 12, 1986. See N.Y. S.B.
9348, 209th Gen. Assembly (1986). Assembly Bill No. 11402 was referred to the
Committee on Codes on June 4, 1986. See N.Y. A.B. 11402, 209th Gen. Assembly
(1986). See also N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DIGEST, 209th Reg. Sess. (1986). Both bills re-
mained in Committee. The Legislature did not pass either bill nor were they reintro-
duced to the Legislature.
168. Several state statutes use the term "sexual penetration" to encompass several
forms of sexual conduct, in lieu of the term, "sexual intercourse." See, e.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(1) (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:1(V)
(1986 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(c) (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
37-1(8) (1994). See also Thomas R. Bearrows, Note, Abolishing the Marital Exemp-
tion for Rape: A Statutory Proposal, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 223 (1983) (proposing
a model marital rape statute that uses the term "sexual penetration").
169. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(2) (McKinney 1987).
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struck from the definition of "deviate sexual intercourse.' a70 An
amendment of this section in the proposed statute codifies the
Liberta decision, in which the court declared the marital exemption
for first degree sodomy unconstitutional. 171
"Deviate sexual intercourse" is the basis for all of the sodomy
offenses in the Penal Law. Beyond striking the marital exemption
from the definition for "deviate sexual intercourse," the Commis-
sion recommended repealing N.Y. Penal Law § 130.38, Consensual
Sodomy.172 The Commission expressed concern that by striking
the marital exemption from "deviate sexual intercourse," courts
might construe section 130.38 to criminalize this conduct between
married persons. 173 The proposed statute follows the Commis-
sion's recommendation and repeals section 130.38.
In addition, the proposed statute repeals all of the sodomy stat-
utes by repealing section 130.00(2), which provides the definition
for "deviate sexual intercourse." The term "sexual penetration"
includes sexual conduct that the statute currently defines as sod-
omy. Thus, a separate sodomy statute is unnecessary. 174 Substitut-
ing the term "deviate sexual intercourse" with the term and
definition for "sexual penetration" ensures that these offenses re-
main criminalized.
170. COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 10 ("[T]he most direct way to conform the
first degree sodomy statute to the Court of Appeals holding ... is by striking the
marital exemption from the definition of deviate sexual intercourse.").
171. See Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 578.
172. See COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 10 n.7. Section 130.38 provides: "A per-
son is guilty of consensual sodomy when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another person. Consensual sodomy is a class B misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.38 (McKinney 1987).
173. See COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 10 n.7. The Commission noted that in
1980, the New York Court of Appeals declared this section unconstitutional as a vio-
lation of the right to privacy in People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). To date, the statute remains on the books.
174. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.40, 130.45, 130.50 (McKinney 1987). The term
"deviate" carries a negative connotation, meaning "departing significantly from the
behavioral norms of a particular society." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE Dic-
TIONARY 317 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 1993). A repeal of section
130.00(2) would eliminate all of the sodomy statutes, which are outdated and unnec-
essary. See generally David A.J. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977) (discussing the
constitutional right to privacy and "unnatural" sexual conduct); Evan Wolfson &
Robert S. Mower, When the Police Are in Our Bedrooms, Shouldn't the Courts Go in
After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 997 (1994) (discussing the use of sodomy laws to deny gay men and lesbians
certain rights).
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The proposed statute eliminates the definition for "sexual inter-
course" 175 and replaces it with the term "sexual penetration."
Although this change is not necessary to codify Liberta, "sexual
penetration" encompasses the definitions for both "sexual inter-
course" and "deviate sexual intercourse" and obviates the need for
separate definitions for those terms.
The proposed statute makes two additional changes to the "Defi-
nitions of Terms" section. First, the proposed statute redefines the
term "sexual contact." The "sexual abuse" statutes use the term
"sexual contact" in their current definitions.176 The Penal Law de-
fines "sexual contact" as "any touching of the sexual or other inti-
mate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of
gratifying sexual desire of either party.1 77 The proposed statute
redefines "sexual contact" to remove the marital exemption. 7 8
This change incorporates the Commission's recommendation to
amend sections 130.60 and 130.65 of the Penal Law.179 The Com-
mission reasoned that the language for first degree "sexual abuse"
parallels the language for first degree rape and sodomy and there-
fore, the rationale of the Liberta decision "applies with equal
force" to this section.180 With respect to second degree "sexual
175. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(1) (McKinney 1987). This section provides:
"'Sexual intercourse' has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration,
however slight."
176. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.55, 130.60, 130.65 (McKinney 1987).
177. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.00(3) (McKinney 1987).
178. Several states use a general definition for "sexual contact" without including a
marital exemption. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-12(e) (Smith-Hurd
1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(D) (West 1983 & Supp. 1995); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(k) (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:1(IV)
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(d) (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(7)
(1994).
179. See COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 12-13. Section 130.60 provides: "A per-
son is guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree when he subjects another person to
sexual contact and when such other person is:
1. Incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than sev-
enteen years old; or
2. Less than fourteen years old.
Sexual abuse in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.60 (McKinney 1987). Section 130.65 provides: "A person is guilty of sexual
abuse in the first degree when he subjects another person to sexual contact:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically
helpless; or
3. When the other person is less than eleven years old.
Sexual abuse in the first degree is a class D felony." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.65 (Mc-
Kinney 1987).
180. COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 13.
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abuse," the Commission said that when a victim is mentally defec-
tive, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, "a person should
be criminally liable. . . even if the actor is married to the victim.'181
The second change involves the term "female," found in the first
degree rape statute182 and in the "sexual misconduct" statute. 183 In
the Penal Law, the term "female" describes the victim and "male"
describes the actor. The current Penal Law defines "female" as
"any female person who is not married to the actor."' 8 The defini-
tion for the term "female" in section 130.00(4) incorporates the
marital exemption and the Commission recommended that the
Legislature repeal the section. 85 A repeal of this section amends
both the "first degree rape" statute and the "sexual misconduct"
statute, and codifies Liberta.86 Finally, to further codify Liberta,
the Commission recommended that the Legislature rewrite any
statutes using the term "female" in gender-neutral terms.187 The
proposed statute incorporates these recommendations.
The proposed statute redefines the element "forcible compul-
sion. 1 88 The current statute defines "forcible compulsion" as
physical force or a threat, express or implied that places the person
in fear of death or injury. 8 9 Specifically, the proposed statute re-
defines the term "physical force" to mean the force used to achieve
sexual penetration without the victim's affirmative consent. 90
The statutory rape statutes provide that certain classifications of
victims, namely those who are under age seventeen and those who
are mentally and physically incapacitated, are deemed incapable of
consent. 191 The statutory rape statutes in the New York Penal Law
181. Id.
182. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 1987).
183. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 1987).
184. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.00(4) (McKinney 1987).
185. COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 8.
186. See id. at 7-8. The Commission stated that although the codification of Liberta
required an amendment to that section of the first degree rape statute in which rape is
accomplished by force only, its rationale should apply in those cases when the victim
is physically helpless and unable to consent and when the victim is less than 11 years
old. Id. at 8 n.5. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (McKinney 1987).
187. See COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 8. The Commission recommended that
the language in section 130.35 be amended by deleting the terms "male" and "female"
and replacing them with "person." Id. at 17-18.
188. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney 1987).
189. See id.
190. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1279; Naylor, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
191. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3) (McKinney 1987). This section provides:
"A person is deemed incapable of consent when he is:
a) less than seventeen years old; or
b) mentally defective; or
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currently provide a marital exemption for those situations in which
the victim is incapable of consent based upon age or incapacity. 192
The Commission recommended, however, retaining the marital ex-
emption for those sex offenses in which age alone is the basis for
lack of consent. 193 The proposed statute adds a section to selected
statutory rape statutes to explicitly state that sexual conduct be-
tween married persons does not constitute a criminal offense when
"lack of consent" is based upon age alone.' 94
In addition to retaining the marital exemption for certain statu-
tory rape statutes, the Commission also recommended that the
c) mentally incapacitated; or
d) physically helpless."
192. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (McKinney 1987). Section 130.25, third degree
rape, states in part:
"A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when:
1. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person to whom the
actor is not married who is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other
than being less than seventeen years old; or
2. Being twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse
with another person to whom the actor is not married less than seventeen years
old."
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (McKinney 1987). Section 130.30, second degree rape,
states in part:
"A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when, being eighteen years old
or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person to whom
the actor is not married less than fourteen years old."
193. COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 8-9. The Commission did not want to
criminalize sexual conduct between married teenagers. According to the Commis-
sion, only the marital exemption in section 130.25(1), which states that a person is
guilty of third degree rape if that person has sexual intercourse with another incapa-
ble of consent for some reason other than being less than 17, see supra note 192, need
be removed. This section, according to the Commission, could not "withstand an
equal protection challenge" since it does not serve the governmental interest of
preventing teenage pregnancies. See id. at 9 n.5. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.25(1) (McKinney 1987). But see Augustine, supra note 28, at 583 (arguing that
married teenage victims are most in need of the protection of the rape statutes); Jaye
Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Marital Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 261, 280 (1993) ("[O]ne must question the wisdom of a statutory scheme permit-
ting individuals to marry at an age when they are not considered competent to con-
sent to sexual intercourse.").
The minimum age one is permitted to marry in New York is 16, with parental con-
sent, and if under age 16, the minimum age is 14 with parental and judicial consent.
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1988). The law prohibits the marriage of
anyone under age 14. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15-a (McKinney 1988).
194. For example in the proposed statute, sections 130.30 and 130.35, which pro-
scribe sexual penetration with victims less than 14 years old and 11 years old respec-
tively, do not provide the section on conduct between married couples since New
York State prohibits the marriage of any person under age 14. See N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 15-a (McKinney 1988). The same is true for sections 130.60 and 130.65. See
infra part III.C.
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statutory rape statutes retain the gender-based language. The
United States Supreme Court, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County,1 95 found gender-based statutory rape statutes con-
stitutional. 196 The Court said that "young men and young women
are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks
of [engaging in] sexual intercourse.' ' 197 According to the Court, a
state may enact a statute criminalizing sexual intercourse with mi-
nor females and not minor males in order to further the state's
interest in preventing teenage pregnancies. 198 Based on that deci-
sion, the Commission found that the State had a legitimate interest
in making a distinction between males and females and the Legisla-
ture should retain the gender-based language in the statute.199 De-
spite the Commission's recommendation, the Legislature amended
sections 130.25 and 130.30 to incorporate gender-neutral language
in those statutes that had previously applied to males only.200 The
proposed statute retains the gender-neutral language in the statu-
tory rape statutes.20'
195. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
196. Id. at 470-73. In Michael M., the 17-year-old male petitioner challenged, on
equal protection grounds, the California penal code that made it unlawful for males to
have sexual intercourse with females under the age of 18. The Supreme Court held
that states had a legitimate interest in prohibiting teenage pregnancies and therefore
gender-based statutory rape statutes bore a substantial relationship to an important
governmental interest. Id. at 472-73. In People v. Whidden, 415 N.E.2d 927, 929
(N.Y. 1980), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981), the New York Court of Appeals
also declared the statutory rape statutes constitutional.
197. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471.
198. Id. at 470. States have an interest, not only in reducing the number of abor-
tions occurring as a result of teenage pregnancies, but in reducing the number of chil-
dren that become wards of the state. Id. at 471.
199. See COMMISSION, supra note 167, at 9.
200. See Act of July 30, 1987, ch. 510, 1987 N.Y. Laws 858 (codified in N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 130.25, 130.30 (McKinney 1987)). An unintended effect of the amendment
extended the marital exemption to wives who raped their husbands. See Robin West,
Equality Theory, Marital Rape and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA.
L. REV. 45, 46-47 (1990) ("Some states, ironically in the name of reform, may have
worsened the problem of marital rape by extending the exemption to include women
who rape their husbands in order to make the exemptions appear 'gender neutral.' ").
201. The proposed statute retains the gender-neutral language in deference to the
New York Legislature. Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Michael M., no evi-
dence exists that the gender-based classifications in the New York statutory rape stat-
utes serve an important governmental purpose. See Whidden, 415 N.E.2d at 929-31
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
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C. A Proposed Statute
NEW YORK PENAL LAW - SEX OFFENSES
§ 130.00 Sex Offenses; Definitions of Terms
The following definitions apply to this article:
1. "Actor" means a person accused of an offense;
2. "Victim" means the person alleged to have been subjected to
the offense;
3. "Sexual penetration" means vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus,
fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or insertion of the
hand, finger or foreign object into the anus or vagina either by
the actor or upon the actor's instruction. The depth of insertion
shall not be relevant as to the question of commission of the
crime;
4. "Sexual contact" means an intentional touching by the victim
or the actor of the victim's or actor's intimate parts directly or
through the clothing;
5. "Intimate parts" means the sexual organs, genital area, anal
area, inner thigh, buttock or breast of a person;
6. "Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a
mental disease or defect that renders the person incapable of
appraising the nature of his or her conduct;
7. "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered
temporarily incapable of understanding or controlling his or her
conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, intoxicant or other
substance administered to that person without his or her consent
or prior knowledge, or to any other act committed upon him or
her without his or her consent;
8. "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious or
physically unable to flee or is physically unable to communicate
unwillingness to an act;
9. "Forcible compulsion" means to compel by:
a) the force necessary to achieve sexual penetration with-
out the affirmative and freely-given acquiescence of the vic-
tim; or
b) a threat, express or implied, which places a person in
fear of immediate death or physical injury to himself, her-
self or another person, or in fear that he, she or another
person will immediately be kidnapped.
10. "Foreign object" means any instrument or article which,
when inserted in the vagina, urethra, penis or rectum, is capable
of causing physical injury.
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§ 130.05 Sex Offenses; Lack of Consent
1. Whether or not specifically stated, an element of every of-
fense defined in this article is the victim's lack of consent.
2. Lack of consent results from:
a) Forcible compulsion, defined as the force necessary to
achieve sexual penetration without the victim's affirmative
and freely-given acquiescence; or
b) Incapacity to consent;
3. A person is deemed incapable of consent when that person is:
a) Less than seventeen (17) years old; or
b) Mentally defective; or
c) Mentally incapacitated; or
d) Physically helpless.
§ 130.20 Sexual Misconduct
An actor is guilty of sexual misconduct when:
1. The actor engages in sexual penetration with the victim with-
out the victim's consent; or
2. The actor engages in sexual conduct with an animal or a dead
human body.
Sexual misconduct is a class A misdemeanor.
§ 130.25 Sexual Assault in the Third Degree
An actor is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when:
1. The actor commits sexual penetration with the victim who is
incapable of consent because of some factor other than being
less than seventeen (17) years old; or
2. Being twenty-one (21) years old or more, the actor commits
sexual penetration with a victim less than seventeen (17) years
old.
3. No offense is committed under this section for sexual conduct
between persons who are married to one another and lack of
consent is based solely upon the victim's age.
Sexual assault in the third degree is a class E felony.
§ 130.30 Sexual Assault in the Second Degree
An actor is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when,
being eighteen (18) years old or more, the actor commits sexual
penetration with a victim less than fourteen (14) years old.
Sexual assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
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§ 130.35 Sexual Assault in the First Degree
An actor is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when he
commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. Who is incapable of consent because of being physically help-
less; or
3. Who is less than eleven (11) years old;
Sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony.
[§ 130.38 Consensual Sodomy - repealed]
[§ 130.40 Sodomy in the Third Degree - repealed]
[§ 130.45 Sodomy in the Second Degree - repealed].
[§ 130.50 Sodomy in the First Degree - repealed].
§ 130.55 Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree
An actor is guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when the
actor subjects the victim to sexual contact without the victim's
consent;
1. Except in any prosecution under this section, an affirmative
defense is:
a) the victim's lack of consent was due solely to incapacity
to consent because of being less than seventeen (17) years
old, and
b) the victim was more than fourteen (14) years old, and
c) the actor was less than five (5) years older than the
victim.
2. No offense is committed under this section for sexual conduct
between persons who are married to one another and lack of
consent is based solely upon the victim's age.
Sexual abuse in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
§ 130.60 Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree
An actor is guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree when the
actor subjects the victim to sexual contact and when the victim
is:
1. Incapable of consent because of some factor other than being
less than seventeen (17) years old; or
2. Less than fourteen (14) years old.
Sexual abuse in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
§ 130.65 Sexual Abuse in the First Degree
An actor is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when the
actor subjects the victim to sexual contact:
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1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. When the victim is incapable of consent because of being
physically helpless; or
3. When the victim is less than eleven (11) years old.
Sexual abuse in the first degree in a class D felony.
§ 130.67 Aggravated Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree
1. An actor is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the second
degree when the actor inserts a finger in the vagina, urethra,
penis, or rectum of the victim causing physical injury to the
victim:
a) By forcible compulsion; or
b) When the victim is incapable of consent by reason of
being physically helpless; or
c) When the victim is less than eleven (11) years old.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not vio-
late the provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse is the second degree is a class C felony.
§ 130.70 Aggravated Sexual Abuse in the First Degree
1. An actor is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the first de-
gree when the actor inserts a foreign object in the vagina, ure-
thra, penis or rectum of the victim causing physical injury to the
victim:
a) By forcible compulsion; or
b) When the victim is incapable of consent because of be-
ing physically helpless; or
c) When the victim is less than eleven (11) years old.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not vio-
late the provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree is a class B felony.
Conclusion
The New York Legislature should repeal the marital exemption
for all sex offenses in the New York Penal Law. The Court of Ap-
peals decided Liberta more than ten years ago and most of the
courts have adopted the rationale of the Liberta court to strike
down the marital exemption for sex offenses. Nevertheless, the
facially unconstitutional statute remains on the books and is incon-
gruous with the current law. As a result, some lower courts still
rely on the exemption to deny victims of marital sexual assault
their due relief.
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New York prosecutors report that they seek prosecution in those
cases in which they have a credible witness. They admit, however,
that prosecuting marital rape cases is difficult, at best. Prosecutors
find it difficult to convince triers of fact and the victims themselves
that marital rape is a crime.
Advocates of rape law reform argue that legislation establishes a
strong policy that supports victims and influences the public atti-
tude toward the new law. If victims of marital sexual assault are to
receive full protection, the Legislature must amend the statute.
